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Comments
Protecting Persons with AIDS from
Employment Discrimination
INTRODUCTION
Between May 26 and June 30, 1988, the federal government
attempted something it had never done before: it tried to reach
every resident by mail regarding a major public health pr.oblem-
AIDS.' As of March 14, 1988, more than 56,000 cases of ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) had been reported
in the United States. 2 Of those cases reported, there have been
more than 31,000 fatalities. 3 As the number of cases reported
each year increases, 4 the medical community must deal with
containing a disease that is epidemic in proportion 5 while the
legal community must deal with controlling the disease "without
wholesale obliteration of individual rights." ,6
One of the rights a person with AIDS has is the right to be
employed. Some of those afflicted with the disease have already
I Understanding AIDS: An Information Brochure Being Mailed to All U.S.
Households, 37 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MoRBmnrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REP. 261 (May 6, 1988) [hereinafter Understanding AIDS].
2 Quarterly Report to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and Rate
of Spread of HIV and AIDS in the United States, 37 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:
MORBIDrrY AND MORTAL=T WEEKLY REP. 223 (Apr. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Quarterly
Report].
3 Id.
4 Id.
Landesman, Ginzberg & Weiss, Special Report: The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 521 (Feb. 21, 1985) [hereinafter Landesman].
6 Reidinger, A Question of Balance: Policing the AIDS Epidemic, 73 A.B.A. J.
69 (June 1, 1987).
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reported cases of employment discrimination. 7 Persons with AIDS
must be protected from such discrimination and may be able to
use section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19738 to obtain such
protection.
Part I of this Comment discusses AIDS, the disease. 9 Part
II explains section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,10 and
Part III shows how AIDS qualifies under that section." Part IV
explores the handicap employment law in Kentucky and how
persons with AIDS will fare under the law.1 2 Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that while persons with AIDS may be safe under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, changes need to be made
in Kentucky law to afford persons with AIDS proper protec-
tion.13
I. AIDS
AIDS was first recognized and reported to the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) in 1981; 14 seven years later the disease is
still fatal. AIDS is diagnosed when there is laboratory evidence
of the HIV infection, the virus that causes AIDS, 5 and an
Case Comment, Employment Discrimination: AIDS Victims - Shuttleworth v.
Broward County Office of Budget and Management Policy, 9 HAirv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y.
739, 740 (1986) (citing AIDS Job Discrimination Case Filed Under New Virginia Hand-
icap Bias Law, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at A-6 (Feb. 14, 1986)); see also Labor
Department Accepts Four Charges'of AIDS Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
57, at A-4 (Mar. 25, 1986)).
8 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9 See infra notes 14-40 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 41-92 and accompanying text.
,, See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 117-32 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
1" Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infections in the United States, 36 CENTERS
FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 817 (Dec. 18, 1987); see
also Friedland, Saltzman, Rogers, Kahl, Lesser, Mayers & Klein, Lack of Transmission
of HTL V-111/LA V Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS or AIDS-
Related Complex with Oral Caudidiasis, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 344 (1986) [hereinafter
Friedland].
11 HTLV-III/LAV is one of several former names of the virus that causes AIDS.
The virus is now referred to as HIV. See Sipes, AIDS the Haunting Facts, the Human
Care, 8 NuRSino Lim 33, 35 (Mar./Apr. 1988).
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indicator disease16 that has been either definitively or presump-
tively diagnosed.' 7 The HIV virus attacks and disables the im-
mune system of an individual's body so that the system is unable
to fight other diseases. Symptoms of the disease include "per-
sistent fevers, night sweats, diarrhea, headaches, anorexia, re-
peated common infections, and dramatic weight loss."''  When
these symptoms become chronic, they are referred to as AIDS-
related complex (ARC).'9 Some patients die of ARC before
developing AIDS.2 0
AIDS can be transmitted by introducing HIV into the blood-
stream or by intimate sexual contact .2 Bloodborne transmission
occurs when the HIV infection is in the blood received by blood
transfusion recipients and hemophiliacs. Injection of a needle
contaminated by HIV also results in bloodborne transmission of
the disease to intravenous drug abusers. 22 Drug abusers fre-
quently share contaminated needles,23 and, due to this practice,
they constituted approximately 19016 of the AIDS cases reported
from April 1987 to April 1988. 24 Another large high risk group
16 Indicator diseases, also known as opportunistic diseases, are diseases which,
when present with HIV, result in a diagnosis of AIDS. Two such diseases are pneumo-
cystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) and Kaposi's sarcoma (KS). PCP is a type of pneumonia
characterized by weakness, fever, dyspnea, and a hacking, dry cough. KS is a skin
cancer that causes purplish lesions and spreads quickly. It rarely kills its victims but
does cause pain, disfigurement, and internal obstructions. Id. at 37.
17 AIDS can be diagnosed without laboratory evidence of HIV infection if other
possible causes of immunodeficiency have been ruled out, and an indicator disease is
definitively diagnosed. Another way to obtain a diagnosis without laboratory evidence
of the HIV infection is when "all other possible causes of immunodeficiency have been
ruled out and [PCP] has been definitively diagnosed or all other possible causes of
immunodeficiency have been ruled out, an indicator disease other than [PCP] has been
definitively diagnosed, and the patient's T4 count is less than 400/cu mm." Id. at 38
(citing Revision of the CDC Surveillance Case Definition for Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome, 36 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MoRBmrrY & MORTALITY WEEILY REP.
SUPPLEMENT 15 (Aug. 14, 1987)). T4 cells are cells that are part of the body's immune
system. They are destroyed by the HIV virus, and this contributes to the body's general
weakening and susceptibility to various infections. Id. at 36.
1, Sipes, supra note 15, at 37.
19 Id.
2 Id.
2 Friedland, supra note 14, at 344.
= Id.
2 Id.
'A Quarterly Report, supra note 2, at 224.
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is homosexual men, 25 who accounted for approximately 68°%0 of
AIDS cases reported during the same period.26 HIV has been
isolated from semen, 27 supporting the belief that transmission
occurs by intimate sexual contact, both homosexual and heter-
osexual.28 However, in a study of 101 subjects who had nonsex-
ual household contacts 29 with AIDS patients, only one subject
tested positive for the HIV virus.30 This individual was a five-
year-old whose mother had AIDS. It is believed the child was
infected with the disease at birth. This belief was sustained by
the fact that the child had been hospitalized with pneumonia
three times since birth. 31 Thus, "[t]he risk of transmission by
less intimate contact is believed to be low or nonexistent. ' 32
Nonsexual person-to-person contact that "generally occurs among
workers and clients or consumers in the workplace does not pose
a risk for transmission of [HIV]. ' 33
In spite of all the bad news concerning AIDS, there is some
good news. First, sources of transmission have been identified, 34
and with education it is hoped that the spread of the disease can
be stopped. 31 Second, there is a test for identifying whether an
individual is infected with the virus .36 In 1984, researchers de-
2 Friedland, supra note 14, at 344.
26 Quarterly Report, supra note 2, at 224.
2 Friedland, supra note 14, at 344.
2s Id.
29 The nonsexual household contacts included sharing a toilet, bath, shower, and
kitchen with the person with AIDS. It also included interaction with the person, such
as shaking hands, hugging, and kissing on the cheek. Id. at 346.
"6 Id. at 347. Another subject was interpreted "as being falsely positive, since the
Western blot assay and a repeat enzyme immunoassay were negative. In addition, the
child was clinically well and had no other immunologic abnormalities." Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 344.
11 Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-
Lymphotropic Virus Type III/Lymphadenopathy - Associated Virus in the Workplace,
34 CENTERS FOR DIsEASE CONTROL: Moiarrm AND MoRTALITY WEEKLY REP. 682, 682
(Nov. 15, 1985) [hereinafter Recommendations].
34 See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
11 See Understanding AIDS, supra note 1, at 261.
36 See Sipes, supra note 15, at 35. But this is not necessarily good news for
everyone because those individuals who test positive for the virus have to live with the
fear of developing the disease and eventually dying from it. Also, they may be faced
with discrimination, employment and otherwise, as a result of being identified as carrying
the virus. However, it is good news because it can be used to identify those carrying the
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veloped an enzyme-linked immunosorbet assay (ELISA) test to
detect the HIV virus.37 But, while the test reveals whether a
person has been exposed to the HIV virus, it does not indicate
whether the person has AIDS38 or is merely a carrier of the
disease.3 9 Another advance related to the disease includes the
effective use of aggressive drug treatment and therapy to increase
the length of the lives of individuals diagnosed as having AIDS.4°
II. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (hereinafter
"the Act") to "maximize [the] employability, independence, and
integration into the workplace and the community" of indivi-
duals with handicaps. 41 One year later, Congress amended the
definition of a handicapped individual because the definition
was too narrow and, therefore, inconsistent with its interest in
passing the Act. 42
The Act prohibits discrimination by the federal government, 43
its large contractors," and programs receiving federal financial
assistance.45 Section 504 of the Act, which governs programs
receiving federal financial assistance, has proven to be a signif-
icant source of protection for individuals with handicaps.4 One
commentator referred to section 504 as "the civil rights act for
disabled persons." 47
virus and, therefore, prevent the infection of others. See supra notes 21-40 and accom-
panying text.
11 See Sipes, supra note 15, at 35.
11 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
11 Landesman, supra note 5, at 521.
,0 Sipes, supra note 15, at 35.
41 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
41 S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AnMIn. NEws 6373, 6388 (1974).
4' Section 501(b) of the Act requires that federal agencies take affirmative action
to employ handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).
- Section 503(a) of the Act requires certain federal contractors to take affirmative
action to employ handicapped individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a).
41 29 U.S.C. § 794.
" See Comment, Running from Fear Itself, 23 Wu kwTrr L. REv. 857, 865 (Fall
1987).
.7 Parry, Summary, Analysis, and Commentary-A Review of the Burger Court's
Disability Decisions Part II, 9 MENTAL & PHYsicAL DIsAaarry L. REP. 2 (1985).
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Section 504 reads, in part, as follows:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.48
The section requires proof of three elements before an individual
can pursue a claim of discrimination. First, the individual must
be "handicapped. ' 49 Next, the individual must be "otherwise
qualified" for the employment he is pursuing or seeking to
maintain.5 Finally, the individual must prove exclusion from
such employment solely because of his handicap. 51
According to the definition in the Act,52 there are three
categories under which an individual can qualify as handicapped:
(1) having a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of a person's major life activities, (2) having
48 29 U.S.C. § 794.
41 See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text.
-1 See infra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
" Proof of this element may not be difficult for persons with easily identifiable
physical or mental handicaps. However, as a majority of persons with AIDS are also
homosexuals and drug abusers, this element may be more difficult for those persons to
prove. Homosexuals and drug abusers are not covered by the Act. See infra notes 52
and 59 and accompanying text. A comprehensive discussion of proof of this element is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
52 The Act defines "individual with handicaps" as follows:
any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record
of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title [sections 503 and 504 of
the Act] as such sections relate to employment, such term does not include
any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of
alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of
the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety
of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The definition was formerly found at
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). The text of the definition has not changed. It is cited by
other commentators and by the Supreme Court in School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla.
v. Arline, -U.S. , 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987), as 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). The
amendment was effective October 21, 1986.
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a record of such impairment, or (3) being regarded as having
such an impairment.53
The regulations promulgated pursuant to section 504 by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) give guidance
on how the above requirements are met.5 4 The regulations begin
by defining "physical or mental impairment. 5 5 Generally, the
definition includes any physiological disorder that affects certain
body systems or any mental or psychological disorder.5 6 In an
appendix to the regulations, HHS stated that the definition did
not include a list of specific diseases or conditions, "because of
the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such
list."' 57 HHS emphasizes that the definition refers only to phys-
ical or mental impairments 5 8 "[t]hus, environmental, cultural,
and economic disadvantage are not in themselves covered; nor
are prison records, age, or homosexuality. ' 59 Individuals in the
above listed groups would qualify, however, if they have a
physical or mental handicap. 60 Next, the regulations define "ma-
jor life activities" as "functions such as caring for one's self,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working. ' ' 61
" 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
- See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31 (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1987).
1, "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiological disorder
or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; repro-
ductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endo-
crine; or (3) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities.
28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1); 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i).
56 Id.
17 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84 App. A (1987). The appendix includes a list of diseases
contemplated by physical or mental impairment: "[t]he term includes, however, such
diseases and conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, and, as discussed below, drug addiction and
alcoholism." Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 Id.
61 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
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Despite the guidance in interpreting "physical or mental
impairments" and "major life activities," there is no guidance
regarding how to interpret "substantially limits." HHS an-
swered, "[t]he Department does not believe that a definition of
this term is possible at this time." 62 The discussion above63 covers
the first category under which an individual can qualify as
handicapped: "a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities.'' 64
An individual can also qualify under section 504 if he "has
a record of such an impairment." ' 65 A person "has a record of
such an impairment" if he has a history of a handicap or has
been misclassified as having a handicap. 66 Examples of people
who would qualify under this category are persons with a history
of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, or cancer, but who
have since recovered, as well as persons incorrectly classified as
having a condition such as mental retardation. 67 The difference
between the latter category and the former category is that under
the latter, a person no longer has to have a current physical or
mental impairment to qualify. If an employer decides to termi-
nate an employee based on the individual's past history of im-
pairment or his fear that the condition will recur, the employee
would be protected under this part of the definition.
The third category of the definition extends coverage of the
Act to an individual "regarded as having such an impairment.
6
The HHS regulations explain what is contemplated by this cat-
egory, 69 which is by far the broadest and will allow inclusion of
62 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84 App. A.
63 See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
65 Id.
28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii).
645 C.F.R. Pt. 84 App. A.
- 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
69 "Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities
that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) has a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities
only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C)
has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (j)(2)(i) of this section
but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.
45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(iv); see also 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(4).
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many individuals who could not qualify under the other two
categories. The HHS appendix gives examples of persons with a
limp or a disfiguring scar as individuals who would qualify under
this category. 70 These individuals have either a physical or mental
impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities
or a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity because someone else believes they are so
limited.
The breadth of coverage intended by Congress is evident
from the statute and regulations. HHS has rejected suggestions
that the statute is too broad and should be confined to "tradi-
tional" handicaps, 7' based on the belief that such a narrowing
interpretation would contravene congressional intent.7 2
Judicial interpretation has also provided guidance for iden-
tifying handicap status. Some courts have recently begun to limit
the broad coverage of the Act by narrowly construing "impair-
ment" and "substantially limits." '7 3 In doing so, the courts have
given little deference to the HHS regulations promulgated pur-
suant to section 504 of the Act. This lack of deference may soon
be reversed, however, as a result of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in School Board of Nassau County,
Florida v. Arline.7 4
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Arline, there were a
few other significant decisions that provided interpretations of
who qualified as handicapped.7 5 In E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Mar-
shall,76 the court defined "impairment" as "any condition which
weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an indivi-
70 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84 App. A.
71 Id.
2 Id.
71 See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986) ("substantially limits"
narrowly interpreted); de Ia Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1986) (use
of narrow "dictionary" meaning to define "impairment"); Jasany v. United States
Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) ("substantially limits" narrowly interpreted);
Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984) ("impairment" narrowly
defined). For a more in-depth discussion of these cases see Comment, supra note 46, at
874-78.
1" School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1123
(1987); see infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
11 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76 E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
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dual's health or physical or mental activity." 7 7 The court rejected
the definition of "substantially limits," 7  however, and empha-
sized the need to evaluate these matters on a case-by-case basis
because the definitions contained in the Act "are personal and
must be evaluated by looking at the particular individual." 79
Arline presented the question of whether a person with tu-
berculosis, a contagious disease, may be considered a "handi-
capped individual" within the meaning of section 504 of the
Act.80 Gene Arline was an elementary school teacher in Nassau
County, Florida, who was discharged from her position after
suffering her third relapse of tuberculosis.8'
After reviewing the requirements necessary for an individual
to qualify as handicapped, the Court concluded Arline was
handicapped and, therefore, within the purview of the Act.
82
According to medical testimony, Arline's disease affected her
respiratory system and required hospitalization:
Arline thus had a physical impairment as that term is defined
by the regulations, since she had a "physiological disorder or
condition ... affecting [her] ... respiratory [system]." 45
C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(i) (1985). This impairment was serious
enough to require hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient
" Id. at 1097.
78 The court rejected the view that "substantially limits" prevents an individual
from performing work he prefers as long as he can perform other work. "A person,
for example, who has obtained a graduate degree in chemistry, and is then turned down
for a chemist's job because of an impairment, is not likely to be heartened by the news
that he can still be a streetcar conductor, an attorney or a forest ranger." Id. at 1099.
The court also rejected the definition because coverage included:
any individual who is capable of performing a particular job, and is rejected
for that particular job because of a real or perceived physical or mental
impairment. Thus, for example, a worker who was offered a particular
job by a company at all of its plants but one, but was denied employment
at that plant because of the presence of plant matter to which the employee
was allergic, would be covered by the Act.
The court believed this interpretation to be overbroad and not the result Congress
intended. Id.
79 Id.
10 Arline, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
81 Id.
11 Id. at 1127.
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to establish that one or more of her major life activities were
substantially limited by her impairment. 3
The court dismissed the petitioner's argument that the Act
does not cover conditions that could "impair the health of
others'' 84 because:
[a]llowing discrimination based on the contagious effects of a
physical impairment would be inconsistent with the basic pur-
pose of § 504, which is to ensure that handicapped individuals
are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others .... The Act is carefully
structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or per-
ceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically
sound judgments.8 5
In addition to being "handicapped, '"86 dn individual must be
"otherwise qualified" to come under the protection of the Act.8 7
The HHS regulations define "otherwise qualified" as a person
"who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essen-
tial functions of the job in question. ' 88 The Supreme Court
addressed the issue of who is "otherwise qualified" in Arline. 9
Relying on its earlier decision in Southeastern Community Col-
lege v. Davis9° to explain the basic framework for determining
"otherwise qualified," 91 the Court adopted the standards sug-
"1 Id. The Court also concluded that Arline could have qualified under 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B)(ii) because her hospitalization would suffice to establish "a record of ...
impairment as required by that statute." Id.
Id. at 1128 n.6.
's Id. at 1129.
See supra notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. § 794.
28 C.F.R. § 41.32; 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k).
Arline, __ U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1130-31.
9 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
9, "An otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980
(1979). In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one
who can perform "the essential functions" of the job in question. 45 CFR
Sec. 84.3(k) (1985). When a handicapped person is not able to perform
the essential functions of the job, the court must also consider whether
any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable the hand-
icapped person to perform those functions. Ibid. Accommodation is not
1988-89]
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gested by the amicus brief of the American Medical Association
for determining whether a person with a contagious disease is
otherwise qualified.92
III. AIDS AS A HANDICAP
Many commentators and a number of states have concluded
that AIDS is a handicap. 9 The broad coverage Congress in-
tended the Act to have supports this conclusion. 94 Therefore,
reasonable if it either imposes "undue financial and administrative bur-
dens" on a grantee, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, supra, at
412, 99 S. Ct. at 2370, or requires "a fundamental alteration in the nature
of [the] program" id., at 410. See 45 CFR § 84.12(c) (1985) (listing factors
to consider in determining whether accommodation would cause undue
hardship); 45 CFR pt. 84, App. A, p. 315 (1985) ("where reasonable
accommodation does not overcome the effects of a person's handicap, or
where reasonable accommodation causes undue hardship to the employer,
failure to hire or promote the handicapped person will not be considered
discrimination"); Davis, supra, at 410-413, 99 S. Ct. at 2369-2370; Alex-
ander v. Choate, 469 U.S. at 299-301, and n.19, 105 S. Ct. at 720 and
n.19;. Strathie v. Department of Transportation, supra, at 231.
Arline, U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1131 n.17.
92 "[Wle agree with amicus American Medical Association that this inquiry should
include:
"[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the state
of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is
transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying
degrees of harm." Brief for American Medical Association as Amicus
Curiae 19.
In making these findings, courts normally should defer to the reasonable medical
judgements of public health officials." Arline, - U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. at 1131.
91 See Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons with AIDS, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1292, 1298 (Mar. 1986); Note, Aids and Employment Discrimi-
nation: Should AIDS be Considered a Handicap?, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1095 (Spring
1987) [hereinafter Note, Aids and Employment Discrimination]; Note, AIDS: Does It
Qualify as a "'Handicap" Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?, 61 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 572 (1986); Comment, Running From Fear Itself, supra note 46, at 935-36; Pear,
States' AIDS Discrimination Laws Reject Justice Department's Stand, N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1986, at A20, col. 1 (the states include New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Maryland,
Minnesota, and California).
94 Particularly helpful for persons with AIDS is the fact that HHS did not try to
come up with a comprehensive list that would include all diseases. See supra note 57
and accompanying text. Additionally, they intended coverage to extend to diseases not
known at the time of the promulgation of the regulations. This is evidenced by language
in the appendix, which states that, "the inclusion of any condition which is mental or
physical but whose precise nature is not at present known" is implied in the definition
of "impairment." See 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84 App. A.
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AIDS fits squarely into the definition of handicapped under the
Act.95 Individuals manifesting physical symptoms of the disease
will qualify under the first category of the definition-a physical
or mental impairment substantially limiting one or more major
life activities.96 While the immune system is not on the HHS list
of systems impaired (which was created to clarify the definition
of impairment), the hemic (blood) and lymphatic systems are,97
These systems are a major part of the immune system and are
adversely affected by the HIV virus. Additionally, by attacking
the immune system, the HIV virus has the impact of attacking
all other body systems. 98 Accordingly, AIDS is a physical im-
pairment.
The physical effects of AIDS alone are disabling and can
lead to hospitalization. AIDS destroys not only the health, but
often the personal life of its victims. People are afraid of this
fatal disease and, therefore, persons with AIDS sometimes lose
their friends and family.9 Persons with AIDS will reach a point
where they are unable to care for themselves because of their
disease. Caring for oneself is one of the definitions of "major
life activities" as defined by the HHS regulations.100 By coupling
the physical impact of the disease with the devastation to the
individual's personal life, "the AIDS victim is substantially lim-
ited in his or her ability to function meaningfully in society."' 01
The interpretations of "handicapped" provided by the Black
and Arline decisions will also assist persons with AIDS in their
pursuit of protection. The Black definition of impairment '0z will
certainly apply to persons with AIDS as they experience the
gradual loss of their health. Also, the Arline decision will help
overcome the argument that a contagious disease cannot consti-
tute an "impairment."' ' 3 Persons with AIDS who suffer from
9 See supra notes 52-85 and accompanying text. For an in-depth classification of
persons with AIDS and how they can qualify as "handicapped," see Comment, supra
note 46, at 893-905.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
"See supra note 55.
9 Sipes, supra note 15, at 37.
9 Id,
1- 28 C.F.R. § 41,31(b)(2) (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987),
10, Note, Aids & Employment Discrimination, supra note 93, at 1107.
102 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
,0, See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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pneumonia' °4 are in a situation analogous to Arline's since the
disease affects their respiratory system and could require hospi-
talization.1 05
Those individuals who are discriminated against because they
are perceived as having the virus will be covered under the third
category of the definition of handicapped-individuals regarded
as having such an impairment °6
It follows from the foregoing analysis' 7 that AIDS is a
handicap. A few state human rights commissions have come to
the same conclusion. 08 The first state tribunal to deal with an
AIDS discrimination case was the Florida Commission on Hu-
man Rights. In Shuttleworth v. Broward County Office of Budget
and Management,'0 9 the Commission ruled that AIDS is a hand-
icap under the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977.110 Todd
Shuttleworth, an analyst employed by the Broward County Of-
fice of Budget and Management Policy, was fired in September,
1984, after the county discovered that he had AIDS. Shuttle-
worth filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human
Relations charging discrimination based on a physical handicap.
Applying the definition used in previous cases,' the Commission
concluded that an individual with AIDS came within the cover-
age provided by the Florida Human Rights Act." 2
"° See supra note 16.
05 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116 Individuals who are perceived as having the virus would include asymptomatic
carriers of the disease, individuals who are in high risk groups, or individuals who
associate with someone with the disease. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
107 See supra notes 93-106 and accompanying text.
101 State human rights commissions that have declared AIDS a handicap under state
discrimination laws include New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Rhode Island, New
Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1986, at A-20, col. 1; see also
Leonard, supra note 93. State laws pertaining to employment discrimination are collected
in LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), FAmr EMPL. PRAc. MANuAL, Vol. 8A, and EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE (CCH), Vol. 3.
109 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 242, E-1 (Dec. 17, 1985). Affirmed without opinion
April 7, 1986. See Florida Agency Reaffirms Decisions on Victim of AIDS, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-3 (Apr. 15, 1986).
110 FLA. STAT. §§ 760.01-.10 (1988).
-" The definition includes people who do not enjoy the full and normal use of
their sensory, mental, or physical faculties. See Note, AIDS and Employment Discrim-
ination, supra note 93, at 1102 (citing Fenesy v. GTE Data Serv., Inc., No. 79-214 (Fla.
Comm'n on Human Relations, Aug. 11, 1981)).
112 Id.
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Although a case has been filed, no federal court has yet
decided whether AIDS is a handicap under section 504 of the
Act." 3 Vincent Chalk filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California after being assigned
to an administrative position in the California school system in
which he had been teaching hearing-impaired students. The reas-
signment came after Chalk was diagnosed as having AIDS.
Chalk's motion for a preliminary injunction ordering his rein-
statement in the classroom was denied by the district court.
However, this ruling was reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.1 4
The court of appeals based its decision on Chalk's probable
success on the merits, relying heavily on the Supreme Court's
decision in Arline."15 The court also relied on three decisions
that were concerned with the legality of keeping children with
AIDS out of the classroom." 6 While the court of appeals' de-
cision is not determinative of the issue of whether AIDS is a
handicap, it may have a persuasive effect on the district court.
Permitting section 504 of the Act to protect persons infected
with AIDS will serve to alleviate some fear and prejudice among
the general public regarding persons with the disease. It will also
allow persons with AIDS to support themselves financially and
to maintain a certain amount of personal dignity. Clearly it was
within Congress' intent in passing the Act to protect such people.
IV. KENTUCKY LAW-WLL IT PROTECT THE AIDS VICTIM?
Kentucky is one of two states'"7 that specifically excludes
persons with communicable diseases from the protection of
-' Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, No. 87-6418.
"4 Chalk v. United States Dist. Court Cent. Dist. of California, 840 F.2d 701 (9th
Cir. 1988).
W1 Id. at 704.
116 Id. at 708. The three decisions relied on by the court were: Thomas v. Atascadero
Unified School Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto
County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987); and District 27 Community School Bd.
v. Board of Educ., 130 Misc.2d 398, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1986). In the first two
cases, the courts granted injunctions prohibiting the school districts from excluding
chidren with AIDS or children who had tested positive for HIV. In the third case, the
court upheld the New York City Board of Education's policy of determining on a case-
by-case basis whether children with AIDS should be permitted to attend school in an
unrestricted setting. In each case the decision was based on the conclusion that any risk
of transmission of the virus was too remote to exclude the children from school.
11 Georgia is the other state, however, a discussion of Georgia law is beyond the
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handicap discrimination laws." 8 The Kentucky law provides,
"[n]othing contained in KRS 207,130 to 207.240 shall be con-
strued to prohibit the rejection of an applicant for employment
* on the basis of: . . . [a]ny communicable disease, either
carried by, or afflicting the applicant.""19 The Kentucky Admin-
istrative Regulations make reference to the book Control of
Communicable Diseases in Man for the definition of "commu-
nicable disease,' '120 The definition is as follows:
An illness due to a specific infectious agent or its toxic products
which arises through transmission of that agent or its products
from an infected person, animal, or inanimate reservoir to a
susceptible host, either directly or indirectly through an inter-
mediate plant or animal host, vector, or the inanimate envi-
ronment. 12
While AIDS fits this definition, it is different from other diseases
regarded as communicable because its transmission is not air-
borne.12Z From a reading of other Kentucky statutes dealing with
communicable diseases, it appears the legislators were contem-
plating a disease more easily transmitted, such as tuberculosis.1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereinafter KRS) section 217.370
prohibits a person with a contagious disease from working in
"a building, room, enclosure, premises or vehicle occupied or
used for the production, preparation, manufacture, packing,
storage, sale, distribution or transportation of food.' 2 4 KRS
sections 317.580 and 317A.130 prevent any barber, cosmetolo-
scope of this Comment. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3(b)(2) (1982) (limitation on commu-
nicable diseases). Briefly, the definition of handicapped person under Georgia law is the
same as the first and second categories of the federal law with the communicable disease
limitation coming later in the statute. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6A-2(3) (1987) (definition
of handicapped).
"I Ky. Rav. STAT, ANN. § 207.140(2)(C) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter
KRS],
119 Id.
902 KY, ADIN. REGs. 2:010 (1987).
' CONTROL OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE IN MAN 447 (American Public Health Ass'n.
1985).
"2 See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
KRS §§ 217.370, 317.580, and 317A.130.
KRS § 217,370
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gist, manicurist, and his or her student or apprentice from
practicing while he or she has a communicable disease. 25
The CDC has specifically rejected declining or terminating
the employment of persons with AIDS from these areas. 126 They
do, however, recognize the need for good hygiene and good
sanitary conditions. 127 Persons with AIDS should not be excluded
from the restriction placed on persons with communicable dis-
eases "unless they have evidence of other infections or illnesses
for which any [worker] should also be restricted.' '128
It is probable that the legislators intended the statutes and
regulations restricting the employment of persons with a com-
municable disease to be temporary measures to protect the public
health. While legislation for the public health is necessary, these
statutes and regulations as written can be used to discriminate
against persons with AIDS. The discrimination would occur
partially as a result of the uneducated fear of the general pub-
lic-the very prejudice the federal government has taken meas-
ures to end. 29
Without Kentucky case law prohibiting employment discrim-
ination against persons with AIDS, a person with AIDS may
face su-h discrimination without means of recourse. 30 According
to one source, there has been no legislation proposed or drafted
in Kentucky that would prohibit employment discrimination
against persons with AIDS.' Until there is legislation adopted
by the General Assembly or until the Kentucky courts interpret
the handicap discrimination law to apply to persons with AIDS,
125 KRS §§ 317.580 and 317A.130.
'" "PSWs [personal service workers] known to be infected with HTLV-III/LAV
need not be restricted from work unless they have evidence of other infections or illnesses
for which any PSW should also be restricted." See Recommendations, supra note 33,
at 693.
' "All PSWs should be educated about transmission of bloodborne infections,
including HTLV-III/LAV and HBV. Such education should emphasize principles of
good hygiene, antisepsis, and disinfection." Id.
123 Id.
129 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
I" This is presupposing that the individual is not employed by a federally funded
program, activity, or agency. If this were the case, the individual would be covered by
the Act. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
M" Telephone interview with Staff Member of Legislative Research Commission
(July 13, 1988) (name withheld by request).
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there is no protection for such persons under Kentucky law. 32
CONCLUSION
AIDS is a deadly disease that must be controlled "without
wholesale obliteration of individual rights."'' 33 AIDS is a hand-
icap, and persons with AIDS deserve protection from employ-
ment discrimination. 134 The federal government has taken steps
to ensure the equal employment of individuals with handicaps, 35
and protection presently is afforded to persons with AIDS in
some states. 136 But Kentucky must change its laws to prevent
discrimination against persons with AIDS because "[ilt would
be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction
between the [non-physical] effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction to
justify discriminatory treatment."' 137
Erica Horn
132 People with AIDS would be protected in.Kentucky if they came within the
federal statutes. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'13 Whether an individual accepts this conclusion will most likely depend on whether
he/she accepts the belief that AIDS can only be transmitted by the methods described
above. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 41-72 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
3I School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 1123,
1128 (1981).
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